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Abstract 
We present a model of the nonprofit organization that leads to an allocation in the economy that is Pareto Optimal. This 
is in contrast to the usual assumption that an economy in which individuals exhibit altruism will not lead to a Pareto 
Optimal outcome.  The presence of nonprofit organizations that function according to this model leads to an outcome 
in the economy that is Pareto Optimal. The result of Pareto Optimality is based on several assumptions, including the 
assumption that nonprofit organizations believe that they will not be earning any profit that may be brought forward to 
the following year. This result suggests an additional reason for the tradition in the United States of absolving nonprofit 
organizations and donors to such organizations from paying income taxes on such donations. The nonprofit 
organizations, by acting according to this model, are performing an important economic role in the economy by 
restoring Pareto Optimality to the economy. 
Keywords: nonprofit, philanthropic, altruism, Pareto Optimal 
1. Introduction  
An ice cream company sells special flavors that benefit charitable causes. A yogurt company donates money to breast 
cancer research from the sale of each product bought. And an oil change company donates a portion of each sale to 
brighten the days of sick children. In all three cases, for-profit firms are engaged in philanthropic activities. Where, then, 
does the for-profit end and the nonprofit begin? And if the line between for-profit firms and nonprofit organizations is 
blurring, then what determines whether an organization should be granted tax-exempt status? This paper proposes that 
there are clear matters of efficiency that distinguish for-profit firms from nonprofit organization.  
We begin by presenting a model for a philanthropic organization and then embed it into a general equilibrium model of 
the economy. While we normally assume that Pareto Optimality, the standard used by economists to assess an economy, 
requires each agent to be self-interested, the presence of such organizations modeled here allow for altruism and mutual 
concern among members of the economy. We show that the presence of such organizations can restore Pareto 
Optimality to an economy in which members are altruistic. This result is dependent, however, on several assumptions. 
One of these is that such organizations make decisions expecting to experience a zero profit. If the expected value of 
profit deviates from zero, the result of Pareto Optimality is no longer found, and the economy is no longer efficient in 
face of altruistic members. Policy implications of this finding are discussed. 
In Economics 101, one of the first things students learn is that the economy, left to itself, is efficient. That is, it functions 
in a way that leads to allocations in which no one may be made better off without someone else being made worse off.  
However, this is true, they soon learn, only if certain requirements are met. One of these requirements that must be met 
is the assumption of self-centeredness. It is the stipulation that each person’s utility is dependent on only that person’s 
own consumption of goods and leisure. The existence of altruism, while perhaps good for the soul, distracts the 
economy from a Pareto Optimal allocation.  
Several weeks later in the same class, students learn a general model for the for-profit firm. Missing, however, is a 
generally agreed upon model of the nonprofit organization. We propose here a model of an organization that is involved 
in providing a philanthropic good. This organization may or may not be a nonprofit organization. We find that when it is 
a nonprofit, its presence allows the economy to operate under altruism while still remaining at a Pareto Optimal 
allocation.  We imbed this model into a general equilibrium model of the economy and then compare the results under 
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the model to those that are Pareto Optimal.  We find that the allocation reached under the general equilibrium model is, 
in fact, Pareto Optimal, provided that several assumptions hold. 
2. Literature Review 
Although there is no definitive model of the nonprofit organization, economists have produced theoretical and empirical 
studies as to the performance and objective of nonprofit organizations and their altruist nature. The vast literature 
includes Schall (1972); Scott (1972); Collard (1978); Greenberg (1980); Kranich (1988); Bernhein and Stark (1988); 
Andreone (1990); Spiegel (1995) Rose-Ackerman (1996); Flores (2002).  Some of these studies proposed some 
organizational objective function to be maximized under a variety of market and regulatory assumptions, and then 
implications are drawn from the outcomes (Steinberg 1986, 1987, 1993, War 1982). Powell and Steinberg (2006) 
provide an overview, discuss existing theories, and propose some minimal essentials for a general nonprofit framework. 
In this study we propose that perhaps the objective function of the nonprofit is one centered on researching and 
articulating utility functions of recipients of altruism in the economy. Such a role allows for Pareto Optimality in the 
face of altruism (Collard, 1978). 
3. An Economic Model of the Nonprofit Organization    
Assume that there are m philanthropic organizations indexed by j and n donors, indexed by i. Also assume there are 
recipients of the good being produced by the nonprofit, all with utility functions Û(xj) that depend on a good xj, which is 
provided by some agency that may be a nonprofit organization.
1
  Each organization provides the recipient with one 
good that the donor cares about. This good, xj, such as housing or clothes, is the focus of the nonprofit organization. It is 
not concerned with the amount of other goods that the recipient receives. Each nonprofit then maximizes, to the best of 
their ability, the utility of the recipients of good xj that they provide, taking the distribution of all other goods as given. It 
does this by using a budget consisting of donations, Bt  to provide xj. We assume that xj is either purchased by the 
nonprofit at a price of pj or produced using paid labor, Nj which is paid a wage of w′
. 
There are two options that the organization may face in working with a budget constraint. If the organization is a 
for-profit organization, it may earn profit in any time period, and any money left over from last period may be brought 
forward to the next period, as would any loss. If the for-profit is truly making decisions on the margin, it will not be 
using any excess revenue to subsidize the sale of other goods. As a for-profit, it would anticipate earning such profit, 
and that anticipated profit would therefore be taken into consideration as it solves its own optimization problem.  
However, if the organization is a nonprofit organization, it will approach its optimization problem as if there will be no 
surplus at the end of a time period. While it is possible that such surplus could arise, any surplus would not be 
anticipated and would then be put back into producing the philanthropic good the following year. This reflects the 
non-distribution constraint that is the hallmark of the nonprofit organization in the United States, since in the U.S., any 
profit earned may not be distributed to shareholders or other stakeholders. The nonprofit therefore faces a “lifetime” 
budget constraint that is carried over from year to year
2
. The maximization problem of the organization is therefore: 
Max Û(x
G’
(nM)  xj(N
e)) +  λ[(Bjt  + pjxj – w’Nt  )  +


1
0
(
tt
t t
B  - pjtxjt – w'Nt)] 
Looking at the last term in this maximization problem, can let 
πt = 


1
0
(
tt
t t
B + pjt xjt – w'Nt) . 
This is the extra income or loss brought forward from previous time periods, and acts as lump sum income for the 
organization. In each time period, t, the organization solves its optimization problem at that time to find the FOCs
3
:  
Nj: Û’(·)xN(·) - λw' = 0  
xj:  Û’(·)  - λpj = 0         
λ: (Bjt -pjtxjt - w’Nt  ) + πt = 0   
In the case when the organization is a nonprofit organization, The term πt in the above first order conditions then drops 
out, since any profit is not anticipated nor included in the optimization problem. This leads to a first order condition 
equal to  
Bjt -pjtxjt - w’Nt = 0 
as, in the long run, the nonprofit will treat any expected profit as zero.  
Looking at the shadow price implied by the first order condition, and letting the portion of each dollar received in 
donations that is used to provide the good be equal to c, we see that, in equilibrium, it will be true that: 
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λ = 
1
c
  
as each dollar of bj purchases 
1
𝑐 units of good xj. It must therefore be true that, in equilibrium, c is the price of 
purchasing a unit of xj, or.  
c =  
𝑝𝑗
𝑒. 
Further, the derivative of xj with respect to N is equal to the marginal product of paid labor
4
. 
xN = φN 
To study the implications of this model of the philanthropic organization on efficiency in the economy, we embed the 
model into a general equilibrium model of an economy that explicitly models a philanthropic sector using several 
simultaneous optimization problems. Since our focus is the philanthropic sector, we do not describe the for-profit and 
government sectors in great detail, but note that the model could easily be expanded to observe the effects of these 
sectors in more detail. While it is possible for a for-profit firm to be participating in philanthropic activities, the portion 
of their endeavors that involve philanthropy are actually part of the nonprofit sector, and are modeled as such. 
The first of these simultaneous optimization problems being solved is that of the donor. We assume that the donor 
receives utility from the increased well-being of the recipient, and can work in the for-profit sector or choose to assist 
the recipient by giving money to the philanthropic agent or by working, possibly for a reduced wage, for the nonprofit 
sector. In addition to the nonprofit sector, we include a for-profit sector as well as a government sector. The general 
equilibrium model is completed with market clearing conditions and a rational expectations assumption.  
3.1 Donor 
Assume that there are n donors indexed by “i”. Each donor cares about others in the economy, and the utility functions 
of these other people enter the donor’s utility function as an argument over which the donor maximizes utility. These 
donors also “purchases” leisure, £i, and a vector of goods, xi
5 
Each donor cares about the welfare of others with utility functions Û(xj), but is concerned about the recipient’s 
consumption of only a subset of the possible j goods. For example, I care if my neighbor has housing and food, but not 
if they have a new, flat-screen TV.  
The total amount of time available to a donor is equal to T, from which they must choose the amount of time spent in 
leisure (£i), the amount of time spent working for pay for the for-profit sector(hi) and amount of time spent working for 
pay in the nonprofit sector(Ni). We assume that, to produce goods similar to xj, the government collects a tax (τ). This 
tax requires that the donor work a specified amount of time (Mi) at the market wage in order to pay that tax. We 
therefore define leisure, £I as a residual. 
£i = T – Ni - hi – Mi ,          (1) 
In addition to offering money and time donations, the donor also purchases goods in the for-profit marketplace. The 
value of the goods they may purchase (with a vector of prices pi) is equal to the sum of the donor’s income from all 
sources (hi, Ni, and Mi), minus any taxes paid (τ) or cash donations offered (bi). Note that xi is a vector of goods, such as 
housing, food and transportation. 
pi xi = ω hi + w'Ni + ω Mi – τ - bi        (2) 
The wage paid in the nonprofit sector (w' for labor Ni) is not necessarily equal to the wage paid in the for-profit and 
government sectors (w for labor hi and Mi). With a production function of φ, assume that the marginal product of N is 
equal to φN, and that the marginal product of labor in the for-profit sector is equal to . A donation of one dollar to the 
nonprofit organization has a marginal product of 
1
c units of xj.  
The total amount of the philanthropic good xj produced in the economy is equal to the sum of the amount produced by 
the government, xj
G
(nMi), and that produced by the nonprofit sector, xj( N
e
) .  
xj = xj
G
(nMi) + xj( N
e
)         (3) 
The donor may give money, bi directly to a philanthropic organizations in the form of cash. This then becomes part of 
the organization’s budget. Donations to nonprofit, bi , are assumed to have a marginal product per dollar of 
1
c. 
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Perceptions on the part of the donor are important, as perfect information may or may not exist in this economy. The 
perception by donor i of the amount of philanthropic good xj is equal to Ψi. This depends on the total amount of this 
good produced by other private organizations (χP), the government (xG, using nMi) as well as the sum of the marginal 
product of the donor’s donations of bi, and of Ni. 
Ψi = χ
P
 + x
G’
(nMi) +
𝑏𝑖
𝑐
 + φNNi        (4) 
The donor maximizes a utility function that is a function of the utility of other agents in the economy, of market goods, 
xi and of leisure, £i. That is, the donor solves a maximization problem of 
Max U(Û(·),xi, £i) 
Substituting equations 1,2 and 3 into the maximization problem above yields 
Max U = (Û(χP + xG’(nMi) + 
bi
c
 + φNNi), ωhi + w'Ni + ωM – τ – bi, T-Ni – hi – M) 
This leads to first order conditions of:        
Ni: U1(·)Û’()φN + U2(·)w' – U3(·) = 0      (5)
 
hi: U2(·)w – U3(·) = 0         (6) 
bi: U1(·)Û’()
1
c
 - U2(·) = 0         (7) 
3.2 The Government 
It is assumed that the amount of taxes paid to the government is equal to the total value of the time spent working to pay 
for them. The government then uses this Mi labor to produce a good that is a substitute for xj, denoted x
G
.
7
 
nτ – ωnMi = 0       `    (8) 
3.3 The Philanthropic Organization 
We now repeat the first order conditions for the philanthropic organization, as outlined above. 
Nj: Û’(·)xN  -  λw' = 0        (9) 
xt: Û’()- pj = 0           (10) 
λ:  Bj  + pjxj – w’Nit  + πt = 0       (11) 
which become  
λ:  Bj + pjxj – w’Nit  = 0          (11) 
when the organization is a nonprofit organization performing this maximization problem assuming it will have expected 
profit equal to zero. 
As noted before, in equilibrium, it will be true that: 
λ = 
1
c
           (12) 
xN = φN           (13) 
 
3.4 The For-Profit Sector 
Labor in the for-profit sector is paid a wage of , with a marginal product of w. Each of the n individuals offers hi hours 
in this sector, for a total amount of paid labor in the economy of H. The amount of the vector x produced, x
s
 is therefore 
 = w           (14) 
x
S
 = ωnhi           (15) 
3.5 Market Clearing 
We assume that markets clear in this economy. This includes the market for paid labor in the for-profit sector, 
H = nhi           (16) 
the supply of the vector of goods, x, which are used by both individuals as xi and nonprofit organizations, as xj, 
x
S
 = nxi  + mxj           (17) 
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Prices in the market for goods clear, and c is found to be the shadow price of the philanthropic good.     
pi = p
e
           (18) 
pj = p
e
           (19) 
c = p
e     
      (20) 
the market for paid labor to the nonprofit sector clears, from both a supply and demand side, 
nNi = N
e
           (21) 
mNj = N
e
           (22) 
The total amount of donations given by n donors equals the total amount received by the m organizations.  
nbj = mBj           (23) 
3.6 Rational Expectations    
We assume that the nonprofit organizations and donors correctly observe and interpret the amount of the philanthropic 
good being produced by the government and other nonprofits as well as the marginal benefit of any donations of money 
or time to the nonprofit organization . In addition, philanthropic organizations correctly interpret the utility functions of 
the recipients of the philanthropic good. Indeed, correctly interpreting the utility function of the recipient may be seen 
as the role of such organizations in an economy with altruism, where individual donors may not have access to such 
information. 
Ψi = Ψ = χ
P
 +  x
G’
(nMi) + 
bi
c
 + φNNi        (24) 
These 24 equations may be reduced to four equations in three unknowns, in the variables Ni, hi, and bi as well as the 
given parameters, T, τ, n, m, φN, and. This is done in detail in the appendix to this paper.  
 
4. Examining the General Equilibrium Model 
This model presented here leads us to several conclusions about an economy which contains nonprofit organizations as 
modeled here.  
4.1 Reduced Wage in the Nonprofit Sector 
The first conclusion that may be drawn is that the wage in the nonprofit sector will be less than the wage in the 
for-profit sector. This has been shown to hold in previous empirical literature dealing with the nonprofit labor market, 
and is shown to be taken to an extreme level in the model presented here (Preston 1988, 1989; Leete 1994). Notice that 
this model assumes that all the donors must choose to give both time at a reduced wage and money donations, and 
cannot choose a corner solution of donations of zero in either case. These severe assumptions, dictated by the donor’s 
problem, dictate a relationship between the wages in the for-profit sector and those in the nonprofit sector that are of the 
ratio 2:1, assuming that all donations are used directly for the provision of the philanthropic good by the organization. 
That is, under the assumptions we make here and later in this model, wages in the for-profit sector are double that of 
wages in the nonprofit sector. This may be shown by examining a subset of the original equations from the model 
presented here. Combining the equations presented earlier 
U1(·)Û’()φN + U2(·)w' – U3(·) = 0        (6) 
U2(·)w – U3(·) = 0          (7) 
U1(·)Û’()
1
c
 – U2(·) = 0           (8) 
xN(·) - λw' = 0           (9) 
λ = 
1
c
           (12) 
φN = xN           (13) 
gives the result  
U2(·)(c w’ + w' –ω) = 0. 
That is, either U2(·) = 0 and the donor is at a point of satiation for income and goods
8
, or in equilibrium the donor will 
choose to work in the nonprofit sector for a reduced wage of w' = w –c w’.  
Making the common assumption that the donor is not a point of satiation for income and goods, we conclude that w’ = 
ω – cw’. In the case where c = 1, where all donations are used to provide the philanthropic good, this implies that 2w’ = 
ω, or that the wage in the nonprofit sector is equal to half of the wage in the for-profit sector. Note that if c<1, the ratio 
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of w’/w increases, as is probably the case in the actual nonprofit labor market. Indeed, in such a model as is presented 
here, the proportion of donations that are used to provide a philanthropic good would be predicted to be positively 
related to the differential between the nonprofit and for-profit wages
9
.  
4.2 Crowding Out   
Previous research has been done on the concept of “crowding out” in an economy that contains both philanthropic 
donors and a government sector that both provide a public good (Andreoni, 1987; Brown 1997; Warr (1982); Roberts 
(1984); and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986); and Day and Devlin (1996).) It is theorized that donors will decrease 
donations to that public good as the government increases provision of that good, as they will see their tax dollars and 
donations as perfect substitutes for each other, with both being used to provide the philanthropic good. In the extreme 
case, crowding may be perfect, and any increase in taxes spent on a public good also produced by the nonprofit sector 
will cause donations to fall, one-for-one. An alternative is found when donors are impurely altruistic. In this case, they 
value not only the provision of the public good, but also their act of contributing to it, as such contributions bring them 
utility directly (Andreioni 1989, 1990). In such a case, donations will not decline one-for-one as taxes used to finance a 
public good increase.  
An additional issue with for-profit firms acting as philanthropic agents might be found in what is sometimes called 
“corporate crowding out.” When people are encouraged to act altruistically as part of their relationships with for-profit 
firms (as, for example, when that firm promises to donate a fraction of their receipts to a worthy cause), this may 
discourage donors from giving on their own, as they believe that they have already contributed to the worthy cause. 
Thus, the philanthropic activities of for-profit firms cannot be seen as perfect substitutes to those of nonprofits.
11 
The model of the donor presented here is one of pure altruism. The donor does not value their donations as separate 
from the utility they bring to the recipient. Therefore, we could expect crowding out to be complete. Indeed, this is the 
case if x
G’
 is equal to xN
10
 in the partial equilibrium context, when only the donor’s utility function is studied. However, 
such results are partial equilibrium results, and may not hold in a general equilibrium framework. Thus, despite the 
perfect crowding out suggested by this perfectly altruistic model, crowding out will be less than complete as other 
changes in the economy are taken into effect. For example, how does the change in taxes affect donations of time vs. 
donations of cash? Such differences will depend on how the donor’s desire for income reacts to changes in taxes. In 
general, we will not expect crowding out to be complete in a general equilibrium framework
12
  
 
5. Pareto Optimality when Organization Optimizes Treating E(π) = 0 
Recall that one of the characteristics of altruism in a competitive economy arises from the assumption that such an 
interconnectedness of utility functions will lead to outcomes that are not necessarily Pareto Optimal. We now compare 
the results found in this general equilibrium model to those that would be chosen by a social planner attempting to 
allocate resources in a manner that is Pareto Optimal. When a philanthropic organization functions in such a way as to 
treat the expected value of their profit equal to zero, that organization may be seen as a traditional nonprofit 
organziation. This removes the πt from the equations presented above, and lets us reduce the 24 equations given above 
into four equations in three unknowns.  
To compare these results to that achieved under Pareto Optimal conditions, we solve the “social planner’s” problem, in 
which a social planner seeks to maximize total welfare in the economy. To do this, the social planner maximizes the 
social welfare function consisting of the total utility in the economy of n identical donors
13
. 
Max W  = nU (Û(mxk +
𝑛
𝑚
 xj( Ni)) + x
G
(nMi) + 
𝑏𝑖
𝑐
), wh + w’Ni + wMi -  - bi, T- Ni – hi – Mi) 
Maximizing over the variables Ni, hi,, M and bi the first order conditions for the social planner are: 
Ni: n[U1(·)Û’()(
𝑛
𝑚
)xN + U2()w’ - U3()] = 0       (a) 
hi: n[U2 (·)w – U3(·)] = 0          (b) 
Mi: n[nU1()Û’(·) x
G' 
 + U2()w – U3()] = 0        (c) 
bi: n[U1()Û’()
1
𝑐
 - U2()] = 0         (d) 
We now compare these results to the reduced general equilibrium model in which π = 0 presented above, and ask 
whether the general equilibrium model implies the Pareto Optimal conditions. The general equilibrium model may be 
reduced to the following equations, as shown in the appendix.  
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U2(·)w – U3(·) = 0          (i) 
U1(·)Û’(·) – U2(·) = 0          (ii) 
Û’()xN – (w’)= 0          (iii) 
Û’(·) – 
1
𝑐
 = 0           (iv) 
We now show the relationship between the Social Planner’s problem and the reduced equations from the general 
equilibrium model. We find that the conditions from the general equilibrium model imply those resulting from the 
Social Planner’s problem when the firm is a nonprofit organization, and expects to earn zero profit to bring forward into 
the future. We begin by comparing condition (a) from the social planner’s problem to those arrived at from the general 
equilibrium model. To prove condition (a) using the reduced equations from the general equilibrium model, note that 
equation iii says that 
Û’()xN = w’ 
Noting the relationship between w and w’ found earlier under our current assumptions, we substitute in to find 
Û’()xN = w – w’ 
or 
Û’()xN  + w’ – w = 0, 
Which can be shown, using the other equations presented here and the assumption that xN = w’ implied by equations 13 
and 14 of the general equilibrium model, to be equal to condition (a) 
Condition (b) is implied by equation i from the general equilibrium model. 
Condition (c), when combined with condition (b), says that U1()Û’(·) x
G' 
= 0. This may be true for at least one of three 
reasons; U1 = 0, Û’() = 0 or x
G’ 
= 0. If either of the first two reasons hold, then a contradiction to the usual assumption 
of nonsatiation of income and goods must occur, for either the donor or the recipient. Rather than have the nonsatiation 
assumption violated, we find, therefore, it must be the case that x
G’ 
= 0. This is implied by the model of the government 
presented here, as there is seen to be no cost to asking for more M from each member of the economy, as all M is 
directly paid for by taxes, . Under such a condition, the government would choose to produce xG until the first 
derivative of the production function for x
G 
is equal to zero. Thus, condition c is implied by our simple general 
equilibrium model.  
Condition (d) is implied by equation (ii) whenever c = 1. This is implied by the general equilibrium model presented 
here in which each dollar donated to the nonprofit sector is used to produce or purchase philanthropic goods. That is, a 
donation of $1 is experienced as an increase of $1 in the budget of the philanthropic organizations that receive 
donations. The equivalence of these two sets of equations implies that the current public policy that grants special tax 
status to nonprofit organizations not shared by for-profit firms is economically correct. It is not simply the philanthropic 
work that leads to an optimal outcome in the presence of altruism, but the nonprofit status of the organization itself. 
Such a status is not duplicated by for-profit firms, regardless of any charitable causes they may espouse.  
Note that, for the general equilibrium model to be Pareto Optimal, several specific assumptions were made. They were: 
1) The philanthropic organization acts as a true nonprofit organization, with expected profit being equal to zero.  
2) All income received from donors is used for the provision of the philanthropic good.  
3) The government has no cost in producing a good similar to the philanthropic good. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
The model of a nonprofit organization presented here leads to an allocation in the economy that is Pareto Optimal. This 
is in contrast to the usual assumption that an economy in which individuals exhibit altruism will not lead to a Pareto 
Optimal outcome. The presence of nonprofit organizations that function according to this model leads to an outcome in 
the economy that is Pareto Optimal. The result of Pareto Optimality is based on several assumptions, including the 
assumption that nonprofit organizations believe that they will not be earning any profit that may be brought forward to 
the following year.  
This result suggests an additional reason for the tradition in the United States of absolving nonprofit organizations and 
donors to such organizations from paying income taxes on such donations. The nonprofit organizations, by acting 
according to this model, are performing an important economic role in the economy by restoring Pareto Optimality to 
the economy. This result is not necessarily found, however, whenever for-profit firms participate in philanthropic 
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activities, as the expected value of their profit is not equal to zero. Indeed, they probably participate in such activities in 
an attempt to increase profit. 
As for-profit firms would be expected to experience positive profits, no matter how many admirable causes they may 
espouse, there is good reason not to exempt them from income taxes. The differences in the underlying attitudes 
towards profit distinguishes the for-profit firm from the nonprofit organization, and provides reasons for granting such 
tax exempt status to nonprofits alone. 
The results of this analysis bring up several questions for future investigation. In each case, the expansion of a general 
equilibrium model and the application of a model of the nonprofit organization as an organization seeking to maximize 
utility of some members of the economy might be applied to questions that remain about the workings of this sector of 
the economy.  
Since nonprofit organizations receive tax protection for their work, and for-profit firms do not, it would be interesting to 
explicitly imbed a tax on the for-profit firm in this analysis. Is such asymmetric treatment justified by a general 
equilibrium model involving both sectors? A true general equilibrium model including taxation of for-profit firms might 
shed light on the necessary conditions for such treatment to be optimal.  
In addition, it may be interesting to expand upon donations by including other types of donations. In particular, it might 
be interesting to change the model to include a two-sided market for volunteer labor, as such a model has been proposed 
in some previous research (Simmons and Emanuele, 2010, Emanuele, 1996).  
Finally, it would be interesting to explicitly study the issue of “crowding out” of donations when the government 
assumes responsibility for the supply of public goods also offered by the public sector. How does crowding out affect 
the amounts consumers are willing to purchase from for-profit firms that are attempting to assume the role of 
philanthropic agents? Are such results similar to those found with donations to nonprofit organizations? 
There are many unanswered questions about the workings of the philanthropic sector with this model of a nonprofit 
organization in a general equilibrium setting. This paper presents only a beginning of a line of inquiry that may help 
illuminate the theoretical framework behind what is often called the “third sector” of the economy. 
Appendix 
In this appendix, we reduce the 24 equation presented in the text to a more manageable four equations in three 
unknowns. As we do this, we make several assumptions, including the assumption that the variable π is equal to zero. 
Recall that π represents profit brought forward from previous years, and, for a nonprofit organization, is assumed to 
have an expected value of zero.       
We begin with 24 equations in 23 unknowns: £I, Ni ,hi ,Mi ,ω, w’, xi, bi, xj, pi, pj, p
e
, xj
G, Ψi , χ
P
, xN, c, λ, x
S
, H, Nj, N
e
, Bj, 
given the parameters  T,  τ , n, m, φN and w. 
£i = T – Ni - hi – Mi            (1) 
pixi = ωhi + w'Ni + ωM – τ - bi         (2) 
xj = xj
G
(Mi) + xj(N
e
)          (3) 
Ψi = χ
P
 + x
G’
(nMi) + 
𝑏𝑖
𝑐
 + φNNi         (4) 
 U1(·)Û’()φN + U2(·)w' – U3(·) = 0         (5) 
U2(·)ω – U3(·) = 0          (6) 
U1(·)Û’()
1
c
 - U2(·) = 0           (7) 
nτ – ωnMi = 0            (8) 
Û’()xN(·) - λw' = 0          (9) 
Û’()- pj = 0           (10) 
Bj + π - pjxj - w’N           (11) 
λ = 
1
c
            (12) 
xN = φj            (13) 
ω = w            (14) 
x
S
 = wnhi            (15) 
H = nhi            (16) 
x
S
 = nxi + mxj           (17) 
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pi = p
e       
     (18) 
Pj = p
e 
           (19) 
c = p
e
            (20) 
nNi = N
e
           (21) 
mNj = N
e
           (22) 
nbi = mBj           (23) 
Ψi = Ψ = χ
P
 + x
G’
(nMi) +  
bi
c
 + φNNi        (24) 
Step 1: We first note that one of these variables occurs only once and can therefore be eliminated. We therefore begin by 
eliminating £I (eliminating equation 1). We also substitute out for x
S
(using equations 15 and 17 to form a new equation, 
11’), pi and pj (using equations 18, 19 and 20 to form a new equation, 12’), N
e
 (using equations 21 and 22 to form a new 
equation, 13’), as well as λ (using equation 12), xN (using equation 13), ω (using equation 14), H(using equation 16) and 
Bj (using equation 23). We have eliminated ten variables and ten equations. We are left with fourteen equations and 
thirteen variables, Ni ,hi Mi, w', xi, bi , xj  p
e
,  xj
G, Ψi , χ
P
, c, and Nj given the parameters w, T, τ, m, n and φN. 
xi =ω hi + w'Ni + Mi – τ - bi         (1’) 
xj = xj
G
 + xj
N
(mNj)          (2’) 
Ψi= x
G(nM) + χP +  
bi
c
 + xN(mNj)         (3’) 
U1(·)Û’(·)φj + U2(·)w' – U3(·) = 0         (4’) 
U2(·)w – U3(·) = 0          (5’) 
U1(·)Û’()
1
c
 – U2(·) = 0           (6’) 
nτ – wnM = 0            (7’) 
Û’(·)φj - 
1
c
w' = 0          (8’) 
Û’(·) – 
1
c
= 0           (9’) 
𝑛
𝑚
bi + π - w'Nj - p
e
 xj= 0          (10’) 
wnhi = nxi + mxj          (11’) 
p
e
= c           (12’) 
nNi = mNj          (13’) 
Ψi= mxj + x
G
(nM) + xj
P
(N
e
)
  
       (14’) 
Step 2: We notice that equations 1' and 11' imply that, when π = 0, that 
𝑛
𝑛
xj + w’Ni – bi + wMi – τ = 0.  
At the same time, we make the assumptions that c=1, that all income received by the nonprofit is used for the 
production of the philanthropic good, and that πt = 0. These assumptions lead to the fact that the result implied by 
equations 1’ and 11’ is also implied by equations 7', 10' and 13'14.  
Making these assumptions, we may therefore eliminate equations 1' and 11', since they are redundant, as well as the 
variable xi. Note that by assuming that c=1 we have also eliminated the variable c, and, by equation 12’, have 
normalized the equilibrium price of the philanthropic good to equal one, thus eliminating the variable p
e 
along  with 
equation 12’. This leaves us with a system of 11 equations in the 10 variables; Ni, hi Mi, w', bi, xj, xj
G, Ψi , χ
P
,  and Nj as 
well as the given parameters. 
xj = xj
G
 + xj
N
(mNj)          (1”) 
i = x
G(nM) + χP + bi + φNNi          (2”) 
U1(·)Û’(·) φj + U2(·)w' – U3(·) = 0         (3”) 
U2(·)ω– U3(·) = 0          (4”) 
U1(·)Û’ (·) – U2(·) = 0          (5”) 
nτ – ωnM = 0            (6”) 
Û’(·) φN - w' = 0          (7”) 
U1(·) – 1= 0           (8”) 
n
m 
bi - w'Nj - xj= 0          (9”) 
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nNi= mNj            (10”) 
Ψi= mxj + x
G
(nM) + xj(N
e
)
  
       (11”) 
Step three:  
Substitute the terms for Ψi and χ
P (eliminating equation 2” and 11”) into the donor’s utility function. At this time, also 
substitute in for xj
G
 and xj (eliminating equation 1”) into the utility functions. Also substitute out for bi (using equation 
9”) and Nj (using equation 10”) and Mi (using equation 6”.) We also note that, since φN is equal to w’ in equailibrium 
under the givnen assumptions, equations 7” and 8” are redundant, and we can therefore eliminate equation 7”. This 
gives us four equations in three unknowns, Ni, hi  and bi as well as the given parameters.  
 
U1(Û’(x
G
(nMi) + χ
P
 +w’Ni + xj + φN 
𝑛
𝑚 
Ni + U2(·)w' – U3(·) = 0    (1’”) 
U2(·)w – U3(·) = 0          (2’”) 
U1(·)Û’ (·) – U2(·) = 0          (3’”) 
Û’() – 1= 0           (6’”) 
Step four: 
Substitute in for the variable w’ =
𝑤
2  as is found in the text, whenever c = 1. Recall that, as found earlier in this reduction, 
w’ = φN. These assumptions eliminate another variable, w’, and leave us with four equations and three variables, hi and 
Ni and bi.  
U1(Û’(x
G(nM) + χP + 
𝑏𝑖
𝑐  + φN 
𝑛
𝑚
Ni)+ U2(·)
w 
2
 - U3(·) = 0      (1”’) 
U2(·)
𝑤
2
 – U3(·) = 0          (2”’) 
U1(·)Û’(·) – U2(·) = 0           (3”’) 
Û’(·) – 1 = 0           (6”’) 
Equations 2”’ and 3”’ imply equation 1”’. Further, this implies that, in equilibrium, the donor equates marginal utilities 
across the various uses of his or her time and money, as they are concerned with only one good that the recipient 
consumes. These results tell us that equation 1”” is implied by equations 2”’ and 3”’, when we incorporate the result 
found earlier that w’ = w/2. We therefore eliminate equation 1”’. This leaves us with a system of four equations and 
three unknowns, in Ni, hi and bi.  
U2(·)
𝑤
2
 – U3(·) = 0           (i) 
U1(·)Û’(·) – U2(·) = 0           (ii) 
Û’()(
𝑤
2
 )– (
𝑤
2
)= 0          (iv) 
Û’(·) – 1 = 0           (v) 
U2(·)w– U3(·) = 0           (i) 
U1(·)Û’(·) – U2(·) = 0           (ii) 
Û’(·)xN –
𝑤
2
 = 0           (iii)  
Û’(·) – 
1
𝑐
 = 0           (iv) 
These four equations may be compared to those from the Social Planner’s problem in the text. It is found that, under the 
specified assumptions, the social planner’s problem is equivalent to the general equilibrium model presented here. That 
is, under the assumptions made, nonprofit organizations help restore Pareto Optimality to an economy that includes 
altruism in a way that for-profit firms do not.  
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Endnotes 
1
 It is interesting to note that the donors of one good may, in fact, be recipients of another good, as when, for example, 
middle class donors receive the services of adoption agencies which themselves depend on donations. 
2
 In this model, we assume that there is no cost to gathering information about the utility function of the recipient. This, 
however, might lead to an interesting avenue of research. 
3
 Note that the first two conditions lead to the traditional Pareto Optimal condition. The ratio of the prices is equal to the 
ratio of the marginal products, in this case, of the use of paid labor (with a price of w’ and MP = xN) to produce x vs. the 
purchase of x directly (with a price of p and a MP=1, as it is purchased directly). 
 
4
 An additional expansion of this model could include a model of a two-sided market for volunteer labor, where the cost 
of using such labor is explicitly taken into account. 
5
 For the purposes of this model, we are assuming that volunteer labor is actually truly free to the nonprofit and that it is 
viewed as a subset of leisure activity, £,  by the donor. A more complex model, in which there is an impurely altruistic 
market for volunteer labor (Emanuele, 1996) is a possible expansion of this model, but is left for future research. 
6
 Throughout this paper, we will use the notation of U1 to denote the partial derivative of U() with respect to the 
philanthropic good, U2 to denote the partial derivative of U() with respect  to goods purchased, and U3 to denote the 
partial derivative of U() with respect to leisure. Û’() will denote the first derivative of Û() with respect to xj. 
7
 Note that we do not impose a cost to the government in producing x
G
, beyond that of using M and paying that labor  
per unit labor. Relaxing this assumption is area that might yield interesting future research. 
8
 In maximization problems, we assume complementary slackness. That is, either the individual is at a point of satiation 
for that good, and the constraint does not hold, or the individual faces a constraint that does hold and is therefore not at 
a point of satiation. As we substituted equation (2) into the utility function, we are assuming that this income constraint 
holds and the donor is not at a point of satiation for income and goods. 
9
 This might lead to an interesting area for future investigation. 
10
 To find the degree of crowding out, compute the comparative static derivative for 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝜏 . In this case, that is equal to 
-
𝑥𝑁
𝑥𝐺′
. 
11
 There is also concern that the growing popular practice of for-profit corporations providing opportunity for customers 
to "do good" by buying the companies product are actually causing harm if these customers then view this as their 
contribution to "giving back" rather than doing what they might otherwise do to give back.  A 2011 article in the 
Chronicle of Higher Education noted that the “trend of corporate social responsibility, such as Whole Foods' donating 
money to charity each time shoppers bring a reusable bag, may in the long run make people less active in civic forums or 
charitable activities and undermines political passions and actions by making consumer choices seem like political acts.” 
12
 Further research might want to investigate the conditions under which it is complete. 
13
 The utility of the recipients are maximized by the nonprofit, and this maximized utility plays a role in maximizing the 
utility of each donor. We therefore do not consider the utility of the recipients directly. 
14Note that this assumption, reflecting the definition of nonprofit organizations, is critical at this point. If π does not 
equal zero, then this step cannot be taken and the remainder of the reduction will not follow. 
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